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GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGIES: TENDENCIES AND PERSPECTIVES
The paper aims to summarize the roots of 
the “Arab spring” in North Africa as well as to 
give an overview of the events in order to offer 
possible answers to the question in the title, 
namely whether the “Arab spring” poses a real 
threat to Europe or not. Having its main focus 
on Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, three core countries 
of the subject, gives the best opportunity and 
probably the most suitable examples of showing 
the nature and the unique dynamics of the “Arab 
spring”: Tunisia as the starting point of the 
revolutions, and Libya and Egypt where the stable 
dictatorships that were thought to be everlasting 
collapsed in a relatively short time, eventually 
resulting in different outcomes. As a conclusion, 
the study offers not only its own findings, but also 
raises even more questions to be answered. The 
single act that was done by a “nameless” figure 
in a rural Tunisian town changed the history of 
the country, then by starting a domino effect, 
beginning to shape the whole region and the 
Arab World though the real outcome still remains 
a question.
Keywords: “Arab spring”, terrorism, North 
Africa, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia.
 
Introduction
In the past three years a large number of 
articles and studies have been published on 
the phenomenon branded as “Arab spring” or 
“Facebook revolution”1, although its real nature 
is not clear for many. In my article, I make an 
attempt to identify the causes that triggered the 
“Arab spring”, what is currently happening in the 
Arab world, and what the consequences can be 
for Europe, including Hungary. 
The series of increasingly violent demon-
strations sweeping across North Africa and the 
Middle East were the results of interconnected 
processes. The situation was partly shaped by 
economic and social causes. Nearly all of the 
heads of states ruling the Arab countries until 
2011 came to power in the ‘60s and ‘70s, after 
having overthrown their ineffective and corrupt 
predecessors2. However, after a while they be-
came similar to their predecessors and created 
their own kleptocracy. That time, the revenues 
from freshly discovered oil deposits seemed end-
less therefore nearly everybody received a share 
from them. However, this system was impossible 
to maintain for long and the public became fed 
1 Rebeca J. ROSEN, “So, was Facebook responsible for 
the Arab Spring after all?”, in The Atlantic, http://www.
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/09/so-was-face-
book-responsible-for-the-arab-spring-after-all/244314, ac-
cessed on 22.10.2013.
2  P. R. KUMARASWAMY, Uprisings in the Arab world, 
options for GOI, pp. 3-6, http://www.idsa.in/system/files/
IB_ArabWorld.pdf, accessed on 23.10.2013.
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up with the completely corrupted regimes unable 
to prevent the pauperisation of the middle class, 
which came into being between the ‘60s and ‘80s, 
as the continuously decreasing national revenues 
were spent on maintaining the ruling elite’s own 
welfare and that of their vassals. Consequently, 
masses protested in the streets and, when authori-
ties responded in the wrong way, people became 
aware of their power. Problems affecting these 
countries include overpopulation, the increase 
of proportion of young generation (15-25 year 
old) to the active labourers, growing unemploy-
ment rate, desertification, lack of potable water 
and food, all aggravated by the global economic 
crisis. Economic reforms initiated by political 
leaderships proved unsuccessful. Moreover, they 
increased society’s financial polarisation3. Mean-
while, funds transferred from abroad by Arabic 
guest workers decreased as many of them lost 
their jobs. Initially, demonstrations were gener-
ated mainly by economic and social troubles then 
well-organised Muslim radicals appeared super-
seding larger groups (e.g. the Coptic Christians 
in Egypt) and turned into government actors4.
Naturally, other factors also contributed to the 
escalation of events, e.g. tribalism, as leaders of 
existing regimes have kept away nearly all tribes 
from power, except their own ones. In North 
Africa, policy-making is based on tribal and clan 
interests instead of common political platforms 
or values; there “the winner takes it all”. Besides, 
interests of great powers and other nations also 
appear in these conflicts. 
The world is not bipolar anymore and the 
America-centred world order is also over as 
regional powers like Turkey, Brazil, China, India, 
3 ***, Spring Tide, Will the Arab risings yield democracy, 
dictatorship or disorder?, A report from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, pp. 25-27, http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/
images/Arab_Spring_Tide_Whitepaper_Jun2011.pdf, ac-
cessed on 23.10.2014.
4 Maria Cristina PACIELLO, The Arab Spring: Socio-eco-
nomic Challenges and Opportunities, pp. 2-6, http://www.
iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai1115e.pdf, accessed at 23.10.2013; 
Marie MOELLER, Economic Voting and Economic Rev-
olutionizing? The Economics of Incumbency Changes in 
European Democracies and Revolutionary Events in the 
Arab World, pp. 17-20, http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/
52733/1/678816808.pdf, accessed on 23.10.2013.
or Iran are increasingly able to represent their 
own interests – even against the USA. In Libya, 
for instance, Italy and China lost their positions 
due to the changes in the country, while UK and 
France influences seem to be stronger. Muslim 
organisations are gaining power although they 
joined the demonstrations with some delay, but 
then they took them under their own control. 
Previously, such organisations were not allowed 
to legally operate, but movements starting as food 
riots provided them with opportunities to break 
out and, even more, to come to power. This is 
what happened in Tunisia and Egypt, where they 
became government actors. Also, persons with 
connections to terrorist organizations or direct 
involvement in previous terrorist acts got leading 
positions. 
After the initial uncertainty, the West had a 
positive attitude to the events, but later it became 
clear that most demonstrators did not really have 
pro-Western emotions5. Naturally, no unified 
scheme can be applied to the countries involved 
in the demonstrations as the processes influencing 
them were very diverse, but a part of the problems 
were similar. For this reason, it isn’t possible to 
point out a single main cause laying at the basis of 
the “Arab spring”, as its break out was triggered 
by a cluster of existing problems. Media had an 
indisputable role in the demonstrations, as they 
were able to influence both the course of actions 
and the public opinion6. However, there are 
many who overplay this role, forgetting the fact 
that Muslim masses are much more affected by 
their social relations and religious leaders than 
media7.
5 P. R. KUMARASWAMY, op. cit.
6  Philip N. HOWARD; Aiden DUFFY; Deen FREELON; 
Muzammil HUSSAIN; Will MARI; Marwa MAZAID, 
Opening Closed Regimes, http://pitpi.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/02/2011_Howard-Duffy-Freelon-Hussain-
Mari-Mazaid_pITPI.pdf , accessed on 22.10.2013.
7 Sara REARDON, “Was the Arab Spring really a Face-
book revolution?”, in  New Scientist, http://www.newsci-
entist.com/article/mg21428596.400-was-the-arab-spring-
really-a-facebook-revolution.html, accessed at 22.10.2013; 
Ben FLANAGAN, “Facebook revolution ‘a myth’ critics 
say”, http://www.thenational.ae/business/media/facebook-
revolution-a-myth-critics-say, accessed on 23.10.2013.
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1. “Arab spring” consequences and the 
generated responses
The events of the “Arab spring” evolving 
from the “Jasmine revolution” took the entire 
international community aback and spread 
euphoria all over the Muslim world. Authoritarian 
regimes having ruled those countries for decades 
were regarded as solid pillars and founders of 
the stability in the region collapsed overnight. 
Initially, all demonstrations of the Arab spring 
began from inside and did not have anti-Western 
or anti-Israel feelings: the population of Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya, and other countries had got fed 
up with the impotency and corruptness of their 
leaderships and took the aim at making social 
reforms in the framework of internal regime 
change. Some of the authoritarian leaders 
were toppled – sooner or later – while others 
were forced to make concessions as the world 
was eagerly watching the performance of the 
revolutionary enthusiasm. 
In Algeria, peaceful demonstrations took place 
and they could have easily gotten more radical, 
but the government managed to outmanoeuvre the 
radicals, thus, currently, the country is peaceful. 
The rest is greatly dependent on who the armed 
forces would choose as the successor of President 
Bouteflika and on his policymaking. 
A similar situation was shaped in Morocco 
too, where the King remains at power after giving 
some concessions – minimal changes in the 
government. In Tunisia and Egypt, the previous 
governments were overthrown as a result of 
peaceful demonstrations, but in the aftermath 
of these events, the two countries took different 
courses. 
In Tunisia, although there was a fear Islamist 
parties would gain ground, managed to establish 
some stability with the use of governmental 
means. 
Egypt was not so lucky. The forces previously 
united against President Mubarak fought each 
other and Islamist political parties, having taken 
not only the presidency, but also 70% of the seats in 
Parliament, thought they can do almost whatever 
they wanted to8. The rest of interest groups did 
not accept such a situation and organised one 
demonstration after another against Mohamed 
Morsi and his allies. Even though President 
Morsi was backed by Muslim Brotherhood and 
offered dialogue in order to establish peace 
and stability, mass demonstrations were held 
against him till the army stepped in, removed 
Morsi from power in a coup d’état early in July 
2013, only a few days more than a year after his 
election as president. The following days, an 
interim government was installed – surprisingly, 
without the involvement of high-ranking military 
officers – with Adly Mansour, President of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court as acting president 
until a presidential election can be held. Even 
though the reason for Morsi’s removal was to 
bring stability and to bring an end to street riots 
and armed clashes, Morsi refuses to accept the 
current situation and considers himself the only 
legitimate president. Mid-January 2014, Mansour 
government enacted the new constitution that had 
been previously supported by 98.1%, even though 
at a quite low turnout – 38.6%, but still almost 
doubling the number of supporters compared to 
“Morsi constitution” of 2012.9. 
In Libya, after J. Christopher Stevens, the US 
ambassador to Libya, was killed in mid-September 
2012, the elected Prime Minister, Mustafa A. G. 
Abushagur, backed down following the second 
failure to get the parliament’s approval for his 
government. A week later, on October, 14th, 2012, 
the General National Congress (GNC) chose 
Ali Zeidan, former GNC member, to be prime 
minister and approved him and his cabinet10. 
8 Charles KRAUTHAMMER, “The Arab Spring is 
no Facebook revolution”, http://www.humanevents.
com/2012/07/12/charles-krauthammer-the-arab-spring-is-
no-facebook-revolution/, accessed on 23.10.2013.
9 Sarah EL DEEB, “Voters Overwhelmingly Back 
New Egypt Constitution”, http://www.nytimes.com/
aponline/2014/01/18/world/middleeast/ap-ml-egypt.
html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=0, accessed on 
22.02.2014.
10 Ghaith SHENNIB; Marie-Louise GUMUCHIAN, 
“Libya congress approves new PM’s proposed govern-
ment”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/31/us-lib-
ya-government-idUSBRE89U18O20121031, accessed on 
23.02.2014.
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Subsequently, political consensus seemed to be 
supporting the country’s political stabilization 
although the performance of the government has 
been rather poor and many experts have envisaged 
the division of the country into several parts. 
The fundamental issue – and the core of 
disagreements – is the way of state-building in 
North Africa. External factors have a decreasing 
influence in shaping internal structures which 
seem to be consolidating and the lack of results 
in Iraq or Afghanistan questions what success 
a process like this would promise. Meanwhile, 
internal actors are bogged down in seemingly 
endless power struggles, therefore the functioning 
of these states is far from optimal. However, 
Tunisia could be a counterexample in a way, 
because Ennahda is clearly in favour of the 
secular state and against the Sharia as the only 
source of legislation. Political stability is shown 
by the adoption of the new Constitution at the end 
of January 2014, bringing changes to the country, 
on the one hand, giving more rights for women 
and, on the other hand, declaring that the Tunisian 
President should be Islamic11. Also unique to 
the country and the Islamic World as well is the 
fact that more than 20% of the members of both 
chambers of parliament are women, in a political 
system of more than a 100 parties. So, tendencies 
can be seen as leading to the right direction, even 
thought Chokri Belaid, leftist opposition’s leader 
and harsh Ennahda critic, was killed in early-
February 2013.
2. The coming to power of Islamist political 
parties and their impact on regional 
and Euro-Atlantic security
For decades, USA and the European states have 
been trying to assist the democratisation of North-
African Arab nations through preventing Islamist 
groupings from gaining power. However, the 
events of the recent past indicate that these efforts 
were futile, and even more, after the overthrow 
of the previous governments – supported by 
11 George SADEK, “The Role of Islamic Law in Tuni-
sia’s Constitution and Legislation – Post-Arab Spring”, 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/tunisia.php, accessed on 
22.02.2014.
the West – former illegal or semi-legal Muslim 
parties became government factions12. Therefore 
it is not the possibility for the Islamist political 
parties to come to power that should be analysed, 
but its impact on the regional and Euro-Atlantic 
security. Several political analysts hold the 
opinion that neither the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, nor the Ennahda in Tunisia will radicalise 
and that they will make compromises with 
Western powers instead. Such opinions are based 
on the fact that both organisations are much more 
moderate than radical Salafists and are willing to 
cooperate with us. Alas, I cannot fully agree with 
this and my position is supported by the history of 
the Muslim Brotherhood or that of the Ennahda, 
and the events in the countries affected by the 
“Arab spring”. 
A part of Islamist organisations operating 
in North-Africa can be linked to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, established in Egypt, which 
supports the one-party system and the introduction 
of Sharia13. However, for various reasons, these 
parties were emphasising the importance of 
democratic reforms, the division of power, and 
of establishing of independent jurisdiction in the 
early ‘90s14. This was partly meant to distinguish 
themselves from suppressive “pro-Western” 
governments and gain popularity among those 
social groups having opposed the regime for 
some reason. Meanwhile, they tried to keep 
their conservative supporters by highlighting 
that, despite their support to democratic 
programs, they did not turn liberal or provide 
support to extending women’s rights, and 
made no concessions related to religious rules. 
12  Tobias SCHUMACHER, “The EU and the Arab Spring: 
Between Spectatorship and Actorness”, in Insight Turkey 
Vol. 13, Number 3, 2011, pp. 107-119.
13 Raymond IBRAHIM, “Muslim Brotherhood: Impose 
Islam ‘step by step’”, http://www.meforum.org/2995/mus-
lim-brotherhood-impose-islam, accessed on 21.10.2013; 
Winston Picket; GARDNER Mark, “The book and the 
sword: The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe”, http://www.
axt.org.uk/HateMusic/Pickett%20&%20Gardner.pdf, ac-
cessed on 21.10.2013.
14 The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information 
Center, The Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world and 
Islamic communities in Western Europe, http://www.ter-
rorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_11_049_2.pdf, accessed 
on 24.10.2013.
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Interestingly, both target groups believed this 
populist propaganda, consequently the support to 
Islamist political parties and organisations have 
significantly increased in the recent past. In order 
to calm the West, the rhetoric was focused not on 
the importance of establishing an Islamic state, 
but on the founding of a “civil and democratic 
state on Islamic grounds”, where mosque and 
state (Islam and democracy) are independent 
from each other (but politics and religion are not). 
Of course, if they had taken a government role, 
they would have represented another ideology, as 
both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ennahda 
tried to come to power in some way. This must 
have been the reason why, at the beginning of 
demonstrations, Islamist parties only watched 
the events and joined the movements later, but 
then they took leadership relatively fast15. 
3. The issues of democracy, stability, 
expectations
Despite various media attempts to present the 
revolutionary character of the “Arab spring” and 
the democratic commitments of moderate Islamic 
parties, some facts should be given consideration. 
For example, what do Muslims consider to 
be democracy and what do Europeans take for 
that? How much will Islam influence our future 
relations? How stable will the new regimes be 
and how much will we be able to cooperate with 
them? Will they want to cooperate with us at all? 
Apart from providing financial support, what role 
can the European Union play in North African 
countries? Will our current economic relations 
maintain? Can they be further developed? Can 
the energy dependency of European countries be 
used, and what security risks does the emergence 
of new players in local and regional policy-
making pose for us? These questions can only be 
answered if certain facts about the Muslim world 
are accepted without idealising them. 
Let us begin with the Arabs’ commitment to 
15 Cynthia FARAHAT, “The Arab Upheaval: Egypt’s 
Islamist Shadow”, in Middle East Quarterly, Summer 
2011, Vol. XVIII, Number 3, pp. 19-24, http://www.me-
forum.org/2887/arab-upheaval-egypt-islamist, accessed on 
10.23.2013.
democracy. In 2006, a survey was made in several 
Muslim countries by John Esposito and Dalia 
Mogahed and the results allowed interesting 
conclusions. The majority of Muslims, although 
positively regarding the freedom of speech and 
other democratic rights, were willing to accept 
only Islamic religious rules in their countries16. 
This does not mean the acceptance of 
democratic standards of the Western world – 
pluralism, recognition of women’s and minorities’ 
rights, etc. This is why whichever Islamist political 
party with religious fundaments may come to 
power, it shall not function in accordance with 
the standards expected by USA or by Europe.17 
In the Western world, church and state were 
officially separated, which cannot happen in 
Muslim societies, as there is no field in life where 
religion does not interfere. If any democratisation 
process begins in the Arab world, that will only 
be possible with the support of Muslim religious 
16 John L. ESPOSITO; Dalia MOGAHED, Battle for 
Muslims’ hearts and minds: The road not (yet) taken, 
pp. 39-40 http://media.gallup.com/WorldPoll/PDF/Esposi-
to.pdf, accessed on 24.10.2013.
17 The European countries committed a mistake when, with-
out any proper knowledge of the Muslim world, launched 
programs aimed at promoting and implementing Western 
democracy. In the past two decades, human rights activists 
have organised several campaigns, placing emphasis on 
the individual rights of people versus the local community 
(state) and they tried to launch new political movements. 
The activities – costing huge sums of money – brought only 
little results as they were not aware of the functioning of 
local civil society. There are two expressions used for civil 
society by the Muslims: “ahli” and “madani”. Ahli refers 
to relatives and groups living close to each other, bonded 
with religious ties. This characterises Muslims better and 
this society is much more closely knit and coherent than 
Western societies, they do not really take in external “for-
eign” influences; they speak no foreign languages; they do 
not need any external financial support and although they 
suppress women in the Western sense of the word they play 
an active role in society. Although Muslim society is suspi-
cious to external influence, it is not hostile. “Madani” is 
used for secular, Western society, which is alien to Mus-
lims and, even when in Western Europe, they want to live 
in accordance with their own social standards generating 
frequent clashes between them and their host communi-
ties. For details, see Amr ELSHOBAKI; Gemma Martin 
MUNOZ, Why Europe must engage with political Islam?, 
pp. 5-7, http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/10papers5.pdf 
accessed on 19.10.2013.
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leaders. Without them, failure is encoded as, 
according to radical Islamist organisations, 
Western democracy exercised by Europeans and 
Americans is taken for atheism, because it places 
the will of people above that of God. In their 
opinion, democracy does not differ from secular 
dictatorships, supported by the USA and the EU 
against various Muslim terrorist groups18. This 
is why the “new political actors” in the North-
African countries regard Western countries more 
like adversaries – or forced allies at best – and 
not as friends. 
This statement also refers to the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, which despite having 
been suppressed by the secret service of the 
previous regime with Western assistance, became 
a governmental factor after the overthrow of 
President Mubarak. Leaders of the organisation 
declared several times that they were supporters 
of democratic transition, but, since their coming 
to power, seizing and keeping power at any costs 
and the introduction of Islamic legal system has 
been more important than anything else19. On the 
basis of their actions, they cannot be regarded 
as a democratic organisation. On the contrary, 
in my opinion, the activities of the organisation 
have a negative influence on the Euro-Atlantic 
security.20 For example, several members of 
Al Qaeda began their “career” in the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which has a fundamental role 
in laying the theological grounds for modern 
18 Western powers established close cooperation with 
Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, even 
more, with Libya against Al Qaeda and the related organi-
sations, and for curbing illegal migration. For the sake of 
their short-term security interests they accepted the rule of 
antidemocratic authoritarian leaders as they did not trust in 
the democratisation of Arab states. For details, see Oded 
ERAN, “The West Responds to the Arab Spring”, in Stra-
tegic Assessment, Vol. 14, No. 2, July 2011, p. 16.
19 Jerry GORDON, No Blinders about Egypt under Mus-
lim Brotherhood, http://www.meforum.org/3369/egypt-
under-muslim-brotherhood, accessed at 27.11.2013.
20  The level of security threat of Muslim Brotherhood to 
European countries is clearly illustrated by the paper of 
Lorenzo VIDINO, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Conquest 
of Europe”, in Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2005, pp. 
25-34, http://www.meforum.org/687/the-muslim-brother-
hoods-conquest-of-europe, accessed at23.10.2013).
Jihad21. Nazi ideas had also huge influence on 
the Brotherhood as the founder of the movement 
Hassan al-Banna not only appreciated the ideas 
of Hitler and Mussolini, but also considered the 
Nazi leaders as role models22. 
The Brotherhood maintained close relations 
with the nationalist-fascist organisation of militant 
Misr al-Fatat, founded by Ahmed Hussein, 
which has been operating as National Islamist 
Party since 1940. Egyptian President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser also joined the Brotherhood later, 
when frictions broke out between the political 
and military wings – leading up to a break-up 
within the organisation – Nasser established the 
Association of Free Officers, which seized power 
in a coup d’état in 1952. Since then, the two 
organisations have been in a continuous conflict 
with each other, but not as an authoritarian and 
secular dictatorship and an Islamist organisation, 
but as two ideologically related rivalling groups 
with similar background. Egyptian presidents 
with military background – Nasser, Sadat, then 
Mubarak – managed to convince the West that they 
are the only ones to contain the Islamist threat by 
making the USA and the European states regard 
them as moderate allies. In fact, when President 
Mubarak took position against the Islamist 
organisations in 1995, it was not the Brotherhood, 
which was an opposition party in Parliament, he 
commited to imprisonment, but the members of 
militant Salafist groupings (al-Takfir wa-i-Hijra, 
al-Gama’at al-Islamiya, and the Tanzim al-Jihad). 
At the same time, President Mubarak launched 
actions against an opposition organisation, the 
Liberal Egyptian Party, which he excluded from 
21 Glen BECK, “Glenn Beck on al-Qaida links to Muslim 
Brotherhood”, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/
statements/2011/feb/04/glenn-beck/glenn-beck-al-qaeda-
links-muslim-brotherhood/, accessed on 24.10.2013; 
Toni JOHNSON, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhoods”, http://
www.cfr.org/africa/egypts-muslim-brotherhood/p23991, 
accessed on 24.10.2013.
22 Cynthia FARAHAT, “The Arab Upheaval: Egypt’s 
Islamist Shadow”, in Middle East Quarterly, Summer 
2011, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, pp. 19-24, http://www.mefo-
rum.org/2887/arab-upheaval-egypt-islamist, accessed on 
23.10.2013; David PATTERSON, A Genealogy of Evil, 
Anti-semitizm from Nazism to Islamic Jihad, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 129-139.
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political life, while the Muslim Brotherhood was 
allowed to have 88 representatives in Parliament. 
In this light, it is clear why, at the beginning, the 
Brotherhood refused to join the demonstrators 
in the streets saying: “The Brotherhood will not 
participate in anti-Mubarak street demonstrations 
as a political force or organisation”23. Several 
other Islamist organisations followed suit and 
joined the demonstrators only when the collapse 
of the Mubarak-regime became inevitable. When 
the armed forces, previously also at power, 
“took power”, they made an alliance with the 
Brotherhood and not with secular opposition 
or the Coptic Christians. During transition, it 
became clear that the representatives of the 
previous regime and the Islamist groupings 
successfully impede any real democratic change, 
suppress groups demanding it, resulting in the 
Brotherhood’s coming to power24. 
Although the Ennahda is a moderate 
Islamist party, its performance has not been 
very encouraging. In 1979, for example, the 
organisation supported the attack on the US 
Embassy in Tehran and, in the ‘80s, participated in 
four attacks against Tunisian hotels. Afterwards, 
in 1991, its members launched an attack on the 
HQ of the Tunisian government party, where 
they lynched one man25. In the same year, a four-
day conference was held by leading Muslim 
politicians and religious leaders in Khartoum, 
Sudan. Among the participants was not only 
Rashid al-Ghannoushi, but also Ibrahim Shukri, 
the leader of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, 
the Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, 
Abassi Madani, the leader of Algerian Islamist 
Salvation Front and George Habbas, representing 
People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 
The host of the conference participants was 
vice president of Sudan Hassan al-Turabi. The 
participants approved a six-point manifesto in 
which they declared “whatever the strength 
23 Cynthia FARAHAT, op. cit.
24 ***, The Egyptian elections: A preliminary political as-
sessment of the post-Mubarak era, The Henry Jackson So-
ciety http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/cms/harriercol-
lectionitems/EgyptFuture2.pdf, accessed on 25.10.2013.
25 Anneli BOTHA, Terrorism in Tunisia, http://www.
issafrica.org/pgcontent.php?UID=19718, accessed on 
24.10.2013.
of America and the West”, in the aftermath of 
the Gulf War, “God is greater”26. The issues of 
liberalism and democracy were also discussed 
with the conclusion that these could be accepted 
only if in harmony with Islamic law. Political 
pluralism was also regarded as acceptable only 
if it was limited and subordinated to religious 
regulations. The manifesto was worded clearly: 
Islamists keep on fighting Western democracies 
until their idealised “pure” Islamic state can be 
established. For this cause, they regarded any 
means acceptable to use as “the end justifies 
the means” which allows acts unacceptable for 
Western democracies27. For example, the current 
leader of the Ennahda encouraged his followers 
to carry out attacks against Western targets during 
the first Gulf War. Nevertheless, Western leaders 
would rather have Islamist political parties in 
governments than in opposition, because, in the 
latter case, they can make significant troubles for 
any new government28. The case of Algeria is a 
good example in this respect: in 1992, Islamists 
won the elections whose results were nullified 
by the armed forces, unwilling to cooperate with 
them. That event was followed by a 16-year-long 
period of civil war, in which Islamists fought not 
only against government forces, but also against 
innocent civilians, taking the lives of tens of 
thousands of people. 
Many claim that there have been no significant 
changes in the North African states, which is 
proven by the fact that the majority of the former 
elite in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya managed 
to preserve their power and – particularly for 
their own political survival – provide support to 
26 Judith MILLER, “The Challenge of Radical Islam”, in 
Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993, pp. 43-44.
27 Ibidem.
28 Some politicians think if former extremist groups got 
government tasks they would change because of the re-
sponsibility and would become law abiding members of 
society. This opinion is illustrated with IRA members, who 
consolidated after the agreement with the organization had 
been signed and completely gave up armed struggle. How-
ever, such a model has not been realized with any Mus-
lim organization. Palestinian Fatah and Hamas are proper 
models of such conduct as both have their own territories 
and plenty of financial support yet neither have been will-
ing to give up committing terrorist acts against Israel. 
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Islamist parties against forces demanding genuine 
democratic changes. 
The situation of economy does not seem any 
better either. Even before the demonstrations, 
North Africa was facing serious economic 
problems. In the ‘90s, its annual economic growth 
was hardly over 3%, between 1980 and 2010 the 
GDP grew only 0.5% yearly, while this number 
in the developing countries was 3%. According 
to the World Bank, the 2011 economic growth in 
the Arab countries was no higher than 3.6%, but 
this estimation was dramatically reduced later 
because of the falling revenues from tourism 
industry. This is rather significant as tourism 
generates 13-16% of the GDP29. In addition to 
tourism industry, significant depression hit the 
financial sector and construction industry too. 
The industries of Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt are 
in ruins, and their population is poorer than a few 
years ago. This generates serious problems in 
the case of the latter two nations as they do not 
have huge oil deposits as Libya does. Due to the 
nearly two year long uncertainties, investors take 
a wait-and-see position rather than risking their 
money. On the basis of the above, it seems clear 
that the primary objective of the population was 
to prevent death by hunger and not the expansion 
of political rights, while, the middle class (regular 
staff in various firms, enterprises, traders and 
public servants), – the engine of demonstrations – 
aimed at stopping the fall of their living standards. 
However, due to the current inflation rate and the 
dramatic increase in the prices of imported food 
this does not seem possible. 
For most people with empty stomach, 
democracy and dictatorship do not differ very 
much. Therefore, powers ruling Arab states try 
to keep food prices low and create as many jobs 
as possible. However, due to the lack of funds, 
this can be possible only temporarily with even 
more desperate masses in the streets later on. The 
economic reform attempts made on the basis of 
Western models brought about only temporary 
29 Elena IANCHOVICHINA et al., World Bank, Middle 
East and North Africa Region. Regional Economic Update. 
May 2011. MENA facing Challenges and Opportunities, 
pp. 4-6, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/MENAEXT/
Resources/EDP_MNA_2011.pdf, accessed on 04.06.2014.
relief for the countries, then, an even wider 
income gap followed. If North African countries 
do not elaborate a new and successful model 
for economic reforms, the region will reach a 
situation similar to the one of 2011. 
It is widely accepted that several changes 
would be vital for the establishment of a secure 
North Africa, such as stabilizing the financial 
environment, reinforcing private sector vs. state 
ownership, an increasing integration of local 
industries into regional and international economy, 
the development of regional trade relations, 
the improvement of social security, fighting 
corruption and unemployment, improving the 
prospects of the population, particularly of the 
youth. Although everyone agrees on these points, 
there have hardly been any measures taken in this 
field – most probably, for financial reasons. The 
EU bled out while trying to save the common 
currency and the Arab world would need at least 
a comparable or even larger financial support 
from EU30. 
The Muslim-Christian conflict also seems 
almost inevitable, thus, questioning the 
possibility of establishing a stable state. Even 
after the change of the ruling regimes, Christians 
in Muslims countries do not have the democratic 
right of freely exercising their religion, they are 
still strongly suppressed, afflicted with various 
limitations and not regarded as equal citizens. 
In Tunisia, for example, a Catholic priest was 
murdered in broad daylight, moreover, groups 
supported by the Ennahda, coming to power, 
attempted to forcefully turn a Christian church 
into a mosque. Some regard this only a marginal 
problem, as Christianity cannot be regarded as a 
“native” religion and most Christians living there 
are foreigners. 
However, Coptic Christians, making up 10% 
of the population in Egypt, have lived there longer 
than Muslim majority, yet since the overthrow of 
President Mubarak, there have been continuous 
attacks against the Coptic communities31. 
Firstly, mobs fanaticized by radical Muslims 
30 Oded ERAN, op. cit.
31 International Religious Freedom Report for 2011, Egypt, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/193093.pdf, 
accessed on 25.10.2013.
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attacked believers.  For example, they kidnapped 
Christian women, forcefully converting them to 
Islam, and, then, forced them to marry Muslim 
men; others attacked Coptic Christian monks; the 
activities of Christian merchants were impeded; 
later, Christian churches were set to fire and 
believers were lynched32. Such events took 
place in early October 2011 too, when Coptic 
Christians launched a demonstration because of 
the destruction of the St. George church in Assuan 
Province. The crowd, demanding government 
protection, was brutally dispersed by police and 
army units deployed armoured vehicles which 
drove into the crowd and killed a number of 
people33. In the most violent anti-Christian attack 
to date, 25 people were killed and another 300 
were injured. Media broadcasting the crackdown 
on the demonstration were taken under military 
control, then their operation was suspended in 
order to prevent the information from getting 
to international news channels34. Similarly to 
Middle East Arab countries, a significant wave 
of emigration took birth, which has been further 
encouraged by the government in order to get rid 
of Christians. According to a report by the Henry 
Jackson Society, in 2011, more than 100,000 Coptic 
Christians were forced to leave their homeland, 
so that they could save their lives35. In the long 
term, however, this will cause serious financial 
problems for Egypt, as the roughly 8-million-
strong Christian minority is well educated and 
work in the most important fields of economy36. 
32 John PONTIFEX; John NEWTON (edit.), Aid to the 
Church in Need: Persecuted and forgotten? A report on 
Christians oppressed for their faith, 2011, pp. 37-41, http://
www.aidtochurch.org/pdf/reports/P&F2013.PDF, accessed 
on 24.10.2013.
33 ***, CNN, Egyptian Army attacking Pro-Christians pro-
testers in Maspiro October 10, 2011,  http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=pvLcJELOj-Q&feature=related, accessed 
on 25.10.2013.
34 Mariz TADROS, “Egypt’s bloody Sunday”, http://www.
merip.org/mero/mero101311, accessed on 03.11.2013.
35 ***, The Egyptian elections: A preliminary political as-
sessment of the post-Mubarak era, The Henry Jackson So-
ciety http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/cms/harriercol-
lectionitems/EgyptFuture2.pdf, accessed on 25.10.2013.
36 In my opinion, Christian immigrants integrate more 
easily within European countries than the Muslim refugees 
and this is the reason for which we shall consider that the 
Yet, Salafist organisations do not care about 
this as they focus on creating a purely Muslim 
country, therefore, the persecution of Christians 
can continue without any consequences. 
In the light of such events, I would not think 
that the Islamist groups coming to power in North 
African countries will be reliable and predictable 
partners of Western countries regarded as hostile 
by them. Nevertheless, for strategic reasons, 
there must be found methods of cooperation with 
the new governments, but they should have a 
bilateral nature. 
4. The role of the European Union
All this makes the question justified: what can 
be expected with regard to the nations of the “Arab 
spring”? A study, made by Rym Ayadi and Carlo 
Sessa, analyses the impact of the transformation 
within the framework of Euro-Mediterranean 
cooperation37. The authors emphasise that the 
current policy of Western governments has been 
rather inefficient; moreover, it partly supported 
the shaping of the present situation. For the next 
two decades, three possible scenarios were made 
on the future of the region. 
In accordance with the scenario regarded as 
the least desirable, the Mediterranean Sea will 
separate in two conflicting cultures. Current 
conflicts will escalate leading up to political, 
economic, and social crises. Crises in the 
Middle East and Western Sahara will generate 
further problems; consequently, North African 
countries may turn in failed states, where terrorist 
organisations will find proper support for their 
anti-Western struggle. Migration from the region 
will grow significantly stronger, presenting further 
risks for the European community that will lose 
all its influence on the region, turning into an 
increasingly hostile “frontier” for Europe. 
Taking into consideration the history of 
former are more prone to leaving Egypt than the latter. 
37 Rym AYADI; Carlo SESSA, “What scenarios for the 
Euro-Mediterranean in 2030 in the wake of the Arab 
spring?” in EU Foreign Policy, MEDPRO Policy Papers, 
25 February 2013, http://www.ceps.eu/book/what-scenar-
ios-euro-mediterranean-2030-wake-arab-spring, accessed 
on 24.10.2013.
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the region, the study examines the cooperation 
opportunities in two versions which are more 
favourable for Europe. In the first version, a 
“Euro-Mediterranean Union” with an integrated 
and common market would be established by 
European and Arab nations. The integration 
would be based on the lessons learned from the 
European Economic Community. However, in 
such a case, the different level of development 
of the member states could pose a problem and 
the elimination of the differences would take 
a long time. On the other hand, a united Euro-
Mediterranean Union would be able to become 
the third great power of the world, besides USA 
and China. 
The other version outlines a loose Alliance 
instead of a Union – the Euro-Mediterranean 
Alliance – where the two regions would preserve 
their independence. In the North, it would 
comprise the EU – including the Balkans and 
Turkey – and, in the South, the Arab states in the 
Mediterranean basin. In this case, there would 
be no common economic region established, 
however, within the Alliance, countries could 
cooperate on either bilateral or regional basis 
and, later on, they could shape an Arab-League-
like multilateral cooperation. In the framework 
of such cooperation, all fields mutually 
important for both regions could be regulated 
(migration, economic and security issues, etc.). 
This approach aims at resolving the problems 
of the region in a multilateral and regional way, 
taking into consideration differing political, 
economic, social, and religious backgrounds. In 
this case, of course, there is no urge to resolve 
the decades-long problems in the Middle East or 
Western Sahara, unlike in the case of the Euro-
Mediterranean Union. 
In my opinion, the first scenario is rather 
unlikely as the Islamist parties currently at 
power have proven before that they can act 
very pragmatically for the stabilisation of their 
countries if it is in their interests. In the current 
situation, they desperately need the financial 
support of Western states (USA and EU Member 
States), which is necessary for revitalising 
their economies and stabilising their countries. 
Naturally, the situation would be completely 
different if they could get funding from other 
regions – the Arab countries or China. In that 
case, they would not need to comply with certain 
democratic standards required by the West and 
the current situation in which they need Western 
support may change. 
For the time being, however, Western states 
are the ones needing the cooperation with the 
North African countries (e.g. in the field of oil 
and natural gas import, limitation of migration, 
countering terrorism, etc.) and not the other way 
round. For this reason, we would need to make 
agreements which we would find unacceptable in 
other cases. 
In the second scenario, more favourable for 
the European countries, the harmonisation of 
states with different development levels would 
cause significant troubles which the EU would 
find unacceptable in the present situation.38
Alas, European states have been often unable 
to take a common position in assessing the “Arab 
spring”, moreover, they openly criticised each other 
with regard to some decisions. This made the lack 
of a common European foreign policy clear for 
anyone.39 When the events in Tunisia began, most 
European states remained silent and waited to see 
which party seizes power and they welcomed the 
revolution only after the Tunisian Head of State 
had fled his country. France had provided active 
support to the previous government by sending 
various crowd control assets and even experts to 
the Tunisian security forces. 
Similar events took place in Egypt, where 
under the leadership of France and with the support 
of Hermann Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton, 
38 Partly due to the economic crisis, EU is currently strug-
gling to survive. Therefore, I do not consider it could spend 
the funds necessary for saving Greece, Italy, Spain, or 
Ireland in North African countries. Yet, we must not turn 
away from this set of problems and should provide some 
assistance to the North African countries as it is in our in-
terests too. 
39 In the past few years, I participated in three Peace Sup-
port Operations in Muslim countries and I understood there 
that most Muslims there do not regard the EU as a real, uni-
fied, and functional power, in contrast with the USA, as in 
their views it is just an economic and political community 
of interests of a few states and may disintegrate anytime. 
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some Southern European countries worked for 
the Egyptian leadership. They thought Mubarak 
was the only one capable of stopping Islamic 
extremists and a democratic transition wouldn’t 
be possible unless he remained in power. Their 
opinion changed only when UK Prime Minister, 
David Cameron, openly criticised the Egyptian 
regime because of its violent actions against 
civilians. Just the week before President Mubarak 
resigned, the EU condemned the Egyptian 
government and called on its representatives for 
talks with the demonstrators40. 
In the case of Libya, EU member states 
unanimously rejected cooperation with the 
Gaddhafi regime, but several of them declined to 
participate in NATO operations launched under 
French leadership, or to unilaterally recognise 
the interim government41. 
On the basis of the events in the region, it 
can be stated that the attitude and relationship of 
these countries to the Western world will change. 
In the future, it is not heads of governments to 
make agreements with them, but governments 
and groupings that – no matter how pragmatic 
might be – they will make politics on the basis of 
their religious beliefs. It is in the interest of the 
EU to create stability for the newly established 
governments, not only within their own nations, 
but also at regional level. Whoever will rule North 
African countries, it is important for them to 
maintain a reasonable cooperation in the fields of 
illegal migration, economic, agriculture, energy 
sector, education, security issues etc.. Currently, 
these states can only be stabilised with the 
financial support of Western countries and we are 
fundamentally interested in providing support to 
them. Naturally, this could happen only with the 
appropriate pre-conditions, meant to provide a 
more efficient protection to Christian minorities, 
and with the respect of certain standards. In any 
other case, not only the stability of the region, 
but also those of the Union will suffer serious 
damage. 
40 European Council declaration on Egypt and the region, 
February 4 2011, http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/nscentre/Egyp-
tRegion_Declaration_EC.pdf, accessed on 28.10.2013.
41 Tobias SCHUMACHER, “The EU and the Arab Spring: 
‘Between Spectatorship and Actorness’”, in Insight Turkey 
Vol. 13, No. 3, 2011, pp. 116.
Conclusions
Although there are more than three years 
since the beginning of the “Arab spring”, its 
consequences and influences have still been 
unforeseeable. Islamic organisations in the region 
– both moderate and radical ones – have clearly 
grown stronger in all North-African countries 
and become government factors. Whether these 
parties grow radical or consolidated when they 
exercise power, or what security challenge they 
present for the Western countries is unknown 
yet. However, it is an obvious fact that during the 
Arab spring several militant Islamists were freed 
from the prisons in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya 
and now are active without any limitations or, 
even more, some of them got into power. In these 
countries, central government has temporarily 
been weakened and, due to the involvement of 
Muslim organisations in governance, security 
forces – even if they could – do not counter the 
various Islamist groups, which, exploiting the new 
situation, are free to raise funds for themselves, 
recruit new members and participate in political 
life in an increasingly active way. For this reason, 
the strengthening of Islamic terrorism in the 
region can be regarded as a real threat affecting 
European countries in the Mediterranean basin. 
Regardless of our intention, it is highly unlikely 
that a Western type of democratic social structure 
could be implemented there, moreover, a further 
limitation of human rights can be expected (the 
positions of the Christians or other minorities) as 
the Islamist organisations in governments wish 
to base their rule on the principles of Sharia law. 
However, it’s not only former prisoners 
who have no limits any more. There are only 
estimations about the number of military 
installations that were robbed and emptied by 
unknown groups, only estimations about the 
quantity of weapons – even heavy armours – 
that were taken illegally for use or for sale. The 
almost non-existent borders of the North African 
countries mean a great opportunity for arms 
trafficking in a region where few AKs can turn 
the outcome of armed clashes for the opposite. 
The former dictatorships had their means to fight 
proliferation, but now, weak central governments 
have no or little influence in remote border areas, 
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especially in the case of Libya border with 
Chad, in the once disputed Aozou region, and at 
the Egyptian-Sudanese border. These weapons 
were taken not only by smugglers, but also by 
militia members and soldiers as well who fled the 
country after the armed fights were over or after 
the government was unable or unwilling to pay 
them. These soldiers with combat experience are 
now looking for other opportunities where they 
can fight for their cause or find their fortune.
In my opinion, this is depending a lot on the 
abilities of the new governments to use their existing 
economic potential for placing their stagnating 
economies on the course of development, and 
also to discontinue the corruption and bribery-
stricken policies of their predecessors; and it also 
depends on the redistribution of the revenues of 
their nations. If they are able to make new jobs 
and rebuild the battered social systems, they will 
be able to gain the support of the majority of their 
societies. Naturally, this cannot happen without 
the (financial, material, know-how) support 
from Western countries as, without that, the 
exploitation of their existing opportunities will 
not be possible. If the aforementioned conditions 
are met, these countries will be stabilised, but if 
their new leaders do not achieve results in these 
fields relatively soon, new demonstrations may 
be launched, determining the destabilisation of 
the region, presenting thus further risk factors for 
Europe, including Hungary. 
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